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Nov. 1951] HELVEY tI. SAX 
[38 C.2d 21; 237 P.2d 1811] 
fL. A. No. 21436. In Bank. Nov. 13, 1951.] 
A. C. HELVEY, Appellant, v. SELIA SAX et at, 
Respondents. 
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[1] Quieting Title-Burdfln of Proof-Title.-In a quiet title suit, 
plaintifi may recover only on the strength of his own title and 
not on the weakness of defendant's title. 
[2] Id.-Burden of Proof-Title.-A plaintifi relying on f' paper 
title alone must trace his title to the government, or to a 
grantor in possession at the time of the conveyance to plaintifi, 
or to a source common to the chains of title of plaintifI and 
defendant. . .. , 
[3] Taxation-Power of Taxation.-The state's taxing power is 
derived from its Ilovereign authority, not from any grant to it 
by the owner of property. 
[4] Id.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Purchasers-Title.-A prop-
erty tax operates in rem against the property, and a title 
granted by a tax deed pursuant to a valid sale of the property 
for nonpayment of taxes conveys not merely the title of the 
person a~sessed, but a new and complete title under an inde-
pendent grant from the state. (Disapproving Syme v. Warden, 
114 Cal.App. 707, 7l.l, 300 P. 863.) 
[6] Id. - Sale for Delinquent Taxes - Purchasers-Title.-A pur-
chaser at a tax sale may receive a better title than that of the 
person against whom the taxes were assessed, unless he is the 
defaulting taxpayer or someone acting in his behalf. 
(6] Id.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Title of State.-State's title 
to property sold for delinquent taxes is dependent on the valid-
ity of the tax proceedings; if the proceedings are invalid 
the assessee retains his interest, but if the proceedings are 
valid the interest of the a3sessee is replaced by the state's new 
and paramount title. 
[7] Id.-Sale for Delinquent Taxes-Purchasers-Title.-The fact 
that the state acquires property at a sale for delinquent taxes 
by virtue of the assessee's default rather than by grant makes 
[1] See 22 Cal.Jur. 167; 44 Am.Jur. 67. 
[4] Quantum of estate acquired by purchaser at tax sale of 
property which is subject to successive estates or different inter-
ests, note, 75 A.L.R. 416. See, also, 24 Cal.Jur. 387; 51 Am.Jur. 
937 . 
. McK. Dig. References: [1,2] Quieting Title, § 87(2); [3] TaxA-
hon, § 6; r 4,5,7] TaXAtion, § 323; [6J Taxation, § 310; [8,!J j 
Waters, § 590; [10-13J Waters, § 592. 
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him no less the source of the state's title and of the title of the 
purchaser from the state, and the assessee and those claiming 
under him are therefore not barred from attacking the title 
of the tax sale purchaser. 
[8] Waters-County Water Districts-Taxation-Delinquency and 
Sale.-The principles established by the Revenue and Taxation 
Code, anJ the decisions construing it, are applicable to the 
statute relating to the title conveyed to a county water district 
for property sold to such district for delinquent taxes. 
(3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 9124, § 47; now Wat. Code, 
§ 31948.) 
[9] Id. - County Water Districts - Ta.xation - Delinquency and 
Sale.-Where plaintiff obtained quitclaim deeds to several par-
cels of land in a county water district sold to the district for 
delinquent taxes, but the deed to one parcel is from a person 
not listed as an assessee, plaintiff, in the absence of producing 
some document to show that such parcel passed from the as-
sessee to the person from whom plaintiff obtained the deed, 
is unable to make out a prima facie case by tracing his title 
to a common source. 
flO] Id. - County Water Districts - Taxation-Actions Affecting 
Tax Titles.-County Water District Act, § 45.5 (now Wat. 
Code, §§ 31950,31952), prohibiting any action attacking n deed 
to the district six months after recordation of the deed or 
three months after the effective date of the section, whichever 
is later, applies to tax deeds executed both before and after 
its enactment. 
[11] Id. - County Water Districts - Taxation-Actions Affecting 
Tax Titles.-In an action to quiet title to land sold to a county 
17ater district for delinquent taxes, the tax deed on which 
defendant bases his title may be introduced in evidence, since 
such district is authorized by statute to levy taxes and sell 
property taxed if the taxes are not paid, and such deed is 
prima facie evidence that the property was assessed as re-
quired by law. (3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 9124; now Wnt. 
Code, § 30000 et seq.) 
[12] Id. - County Water Districts - Taxation-Actions Affecting 
Tax Titles.-In an action to quiet title to land sold to a county 
water district for delinquent taxes, plaintiff may not success-
fully attack the validity of the taxes on the ground that the 
land received no benefits b:;" being included in the district, 
where the assessed owners through whom plaintiff cla~ms did 
not avail themselves of their statutory remedy to have their 
property excluded from the dLtrict on thc ground that it was 
not benefited by inclusion therein (3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 
9124, § 28; now Wat. Code, § 32200 et seq.), and where they 
failed to challenge the taxes in the manner provided by the 
County Water District Act. 
Nov. 1951] HELVEY V. SAX 
(38 C.2d 21; 237 P.2d 269) 
23 
[13] Id.-County Water Districts-Taxation-Ac~ions Affecting 
Tax Titles.-In an action to quiet title to land sold to a county ! 
water district for delinquent taxes, plaintiff may not success-
fully claim that the liens of the taxes were released by the 
Federal Reclamation Act (43 U.S.C. §§ 423, 423a), where, as-
suming that this statute applies to a California water district 
on the ground that California ratified the Colorado River Com-
pact, plaintiff does not plead or prove that the Board of Sur-
vey and Adjustments had made such a finding with respect 
to the property involved in the case. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Stanley Mosk, Judge. Modified and affirmed. 
Action to quiet title. Judgment for defendants modified and 
affirmed. 
William M. Taylor for Appellant. 
Newby, Holder & Newby, Newman & Newman, Earl Red-
wine and Jonah Jones, Jr., for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J.-The plaintiff, A. C. Helvey, brought this 
action to quiet title to several parcels of land in the Coachella 
Valley County Water District. Taxes levied by the district 
became delinquent and the several parcels were sold to the 
district in September, 1939. The parcels were not redeemed 
within the time allowed by law and were sold by the district 
to the defendants at public auction in 1946 and 1947. 
Defendants base their titles on their tax deeds. Plaintiff 
relies on quitclaim deeds obtained in 1946 and 1947. Two of 
the deeds are from assessees named in the tax deeds; the 
third deed is from a person not listed as an assessee. There 
is no proof that any of the three predecessors of plaintiff were 
in possession at the time of their deeds to plaintiff, nor is 
there any proof of antecedent title of the three grantors. 
Judgment was entered for defendants and plaintiff appeals. 
The question arises at the outset whether plaintiff offered 
sufficient evidence supporting his title to make out a prima 
facie case to avoid a nonsuit. (See Santens v. Los Angeles 
Finance Co., 91 Cal.App.2d 197, 202 [204 P.2d 619]; cases 
collected in 22 Cal.Jur. 167.) 
[1] In a quiet title suit, the plaintiff may recover only 
upon the strength of his own title and not upon the weakness 
of defendant's title. (Rockey v. Vieux, 179 Cal. 681 [178 
I 
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P. 712] j see 22 Cal.Jur. 167.} [2] A plaintiff relying on al 
paper title alone must trace his title (1) to the government;! 
or (2) to a grantor in possession at the time of the conveyance 
to the plaintiff; or (3) to a source common to the chains of 
title of plaintiff and defendant. (Rockey v. Vieux, supra.) 
Plaintiff did not offer evidence to sustain a prima facie case, 
on either of the first two alternatives. He did sbow tbat bis \ 
title to two of the three lots was derived from Moorc and 
McFadden, assessees named in the deeds from the collector 
to the water district. 
It is contendcd that plaintiff failed to show a common . 
source of title, even as to Moore and McFadden, on tbe ground • 
that the new and complete title acquired by the tax deed was 
derived from the state and not from the owner of the prop{>rty. 
[3] The state's taxing power is derived from its SOVCT'Pig-D 
authority, not from any grant to it by the owner of proppJ·ty. 
[4] A property tax operates in rem against tbe propt'rty. 
and a title granted by a tax deed pursuant to a valid sule 
of the property for nonpayment of taxes, conveys not merely 
the title of the person assessed, but a new and complete t it Ie 
under an independent grant from the state. (Rev. & Tux. 
Code, §§ 3712, 3520; California Loan etc. Co. v. Weis, 118 
Cal. 489, 492, 494 [50 P. 697]; Connors v. Jerome, 83 Cal. 
App.2d 330 [188 P.2d 770] ; see Smith v. Addiego, 54 Cal. 
App.2d 230, 237 [129 P.2d 953] ; 75 A.L.R. 416; 51 Am.Jur., 
Taxation, 937.) The statement in Syme v. Warden, 114 Cal. 
App. 707, 712 [300 P. 863], that a tax deed conveYfi only 
such interest as the taxpayer has in the land was unnecessary 
to thc decision therein. It is inconsistent with the foregoing 
cases and presently controlling statutes and is disapproved. 
In Dorn v. Baker, 96 Cal. 206, 209 [31 P. 37], the purchaser 
at the tax sale received only the equitable interest of the 
assessee in state school land, since the fee owned by the state 
was not subject to taxation. (People v. Chambers, 37 Cal.2d 
552, 555 [233 P.2d 557]; State Land Settlement Board v. 
Henderson, 197 Cal. 470, 479 [241 P. 560] ; San Pedro etc. 
R. R. Co. v. Los Angeles, 180 Cal. 18, 22 [179 P. 393].) 
[5] A purchaser at the tax sale may thus receive a better 
title than that of the person against whom the taxes were 
assessed, unless he is the defaulting taxpayer or someone 
acting in his behalf. (Dowd v. Glenn, 54 Cal.App.2d 748, 755 
[129 P.2d 964].) 
It does not follow, however, that an owner out of posses. 
sion, or persons claiming under him, cannot establish a prima 
) 
) 
Nov. 1951J HELVEY tI. SAX 
[38 C.2d 21; 237 P.2d 269J 
25 
facie case by tracing title to the assessed owner. [6] The 
proceedings against the property are the means by which the 
state obtains its title. If the proceedings are invalid, the 
assessee retains his interest. If the proceedings are valid, 
the interest of the assessee is replaced by the state's Dew 
and paramount title. The title of the state is thus depend-
ent on the validity of the tax proceedings, just as the interest 
of an ordinary grantee is dependent on an effective convey-
ance by his grantor. The assessee's interest is extinguished, 
because he fails to pay the taxes or redeem the property. 
[7] The fact that the state acquires the property by virtue 
of his default rather than by grant makes him no less the 
source of the state's title and of the title of the purchaser 
from the state. (Denning v. Green, 88 Cal.App. 379, 381 [263 
P. 819] ; Denning v. Green, 119 Cal.App. 102, 104 [6 P.2d 317) ; 
Ginaca v. Peterson, 262 F. 904, 907; Godding v. Swanson, 
165 Pa.Super. 193 [67 A.2d 814] ; Porter v. Carroll, 84 Fla. 
62 [92 So. 809].) The assessee and those claiming under him 
are therefore not barred from attacking the title of the tax 
sale purchaser. 
[8] The principles established by the Revenue and Taxa-
tion Code, and the decisions construing it, are applicable to 
the similar statute involved in the present case. (3 Deering's 
Gen. Laws, Act 9124, § 47,· now Wat. Code, § 31948; see 
Dowd v. Glenn, 54 Cal.App.2d 748 [129 P.2d 964].) 
[9] The plaintiff in this action traced his paper title to 
Lots four and six to the assessees. On Lot two, however, plain-
tiff produced only a quitclaim deed from one Brady. The deed 
to the district is included in the record and shows that the 
property was assessed to one I vans. An inference may be 
drawn from the testimony that Ivans was the deceased mother 
of Brady. Plaintiff, however, did not produce a deed or a 
decree of distribution to show that the property passed from 
hans to Brady. Plaintiff was thus unable to make out a prima 
facie case by tracing his and Dunlap's title to a common source. 
[10] Plaintiff's action against defendant Budrovic is barred 
by the statute of limitations, which Budrovic pleaded. Sec-
tion 45.5 of the County Water District Act (now Wat. Code, 
., 'Such deed duly acknowledged or proved is (except as against actual 
fraud) conclusive evidence of the regularity of all the proceedings from 
the assessment by the assessor inclusive up to the execution of the deed. 
The deed conveys to the district the absolute title to the lands descrihed 
t11Prein, free of all encumbrances, except when the land is owned by 
the United States or this State in which case it is prima facie llvidence 
of the right of pOlisession." 
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§§ 31950, 31952) prevents any action attacking a deed to the 
district six months after the recordation of the deed, or three 
months after the effective date of the section (January 30, 
1941), whichever is later. The statute applies to tax deeds 
executed both before and after its enactment. (McCaslin 
v. Hamblen, 37 Ca1.2d 196 [231 P.2d 1]; Tannhauser v. 
Adams, 31 Ca1.2d 169, 176 [187 P.2d 716, 5 A.L.R.2d 1015] ; 
Central Valley Equip. Co. v. State, 98 Cal.App.2d 778 [220 
P.2d 811] ; Davault v. Essig, 80 Cal.App.2d 970 (183 P.2d 
39].) Since plaintiff commenced this action in 1947, over 
six years after the effective date of section 45.5, his action is 
barred. 
Although defendant Carreon did not plead the statute 
of limitations, plaintiff's attack on his title fails on the merits. 
For the same reasons his attack on the titles of Dunlap and 
Budrovic must fail, even if he were able to make out a prima 
facie case against Dunlap and his action against Budrovic 
were not barred by the statute of limitations. 
[11] There is no merit in plaintiff's contention that the 
tax deed could not be introduced in evidence, on the ground 
that defendants did not show that the district had the powel' 
to levy taxes, The district has all the powers of distrieh 
organized under the County Water District Act (3 Deerinl! 's 
Gen. Laws, Act 9124, now Wat. Code, § 30000 et seq.; S('P 
2 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 6178, now Wat. Code, § 33135). 
which authorizes the district to levy taxes and sell property 
taxed, if the taxes are not paid. (3 Deering's Gen. Laws, A("t 
9124, §§ 21-22, now Wat. Code, § 31745 et seq.) Moreover. 
the tax deeds were prima facie evidence that the property 
was assessed as required by law. (3 Deering's Gen. Laws. 
Act 9124, § 47, now Wat. Code, § 31947.) 
[12] Plaintiff contends that the taxes are void on Hl<' 
ground that the parcels involved in this action received no 
benefits by being included in the district. This contention 
comes too late. The assessed owners through whom plaintiff 
claims did not avail themselves of their stlltutorv remedv to 
have their property excluded from the district o~ the grdund 
that it was not benefited by inclusion therein. (3 Deering's 
Gen. Laws, Act 9124, § 28, now Wat. Code, § 32200 et seq.; 
see Hand v. El DOl'ado Irr, Di.~t., 97 Cal.App. 740 [276 P. 1371 : 
San Joaquin Anr. Corp. v. Board of Supervi.~or.~. 1?1 Cal. 
App. 468 r8 P.2d 1051].) Moreover, there if; nothing in thf' 
t'vidf'llee to show that plaintiff's preo(>Cf'f;f;OrS (' hl1 Hen [!f'Cl the 
taxes in the manner provided by the County Water District 
-) 
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At't. There was 110 attempt to have the tnx assessments 
mod ified or cancelJed, or to set aside the tax deeds to the 
distri(:t. (3 Deering's Gen. Laws, Act 9124, § 3S, now Wat. 
Code, § 3191j5.) Since plaintiff's predecessors in interest 
faileu to challenge the tax in the D,anner required by statute, 
plallltifi' is now precluded from making a collateral attack on 
thl" tax proceedings. (Wall v. ill. <17 R. Shtep Co., 33 Ca1.2d 
i(i~. 172 [205 P.2d 14J ; see Reclamation Dist. v. Turner, 104 
Ca1. 334, 335 l37 P. 1038] ; see Durnbarton Land ct Imp. Co. 
v. Murphy, 32 Cal.App. 626, 630 [163 P. 866].) 
[13] Plaintiff also contends that the liens of the taxes 
were released by the Federal Reclamation Act (43 U.S.C. 
§§ 423, 423a), which provides that lands found to be perma-
llently unproductive by the Board of Survey and Adjustments 
shall be excluded from irrigation districts. Even if it is 
assumed that this statute applies to a California water district 
01) the ground that California ratified the Colorado River 
Compact, plaintiff made no attempt to plead or prove that 
the Board of Survey and Adjustments had made such a find-
ing with respect to the lands involved in this case. 
The trial court ordered judgment for plaintiff on parcels 
fiY(' and eight, against defendants who had defaulted, but the 
judgment as entered failed to giYe judgment to plaintiff against 
the dcfalllting defendants. Plaintiff is entitled to a correct 
judgment. The trial court is therefore directed to modify 
the judgment to quiet plaintiff's title against the defaulting 
defendants to lots five and eight. In all other respects the 
judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff shall bear the costs of appeal. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., 
and Spence, J. concurred. 
